











ABSTRACT: This study examines land contract decision-making with
the use of an eastern Arkansas data set. Estimated probit models used
to test contract choice hypotheses support a credit constraint hypothesis,
indicating that contract choice is based on: 1) the tenant’s ﬁnancial
position and operating expense levels, 2) the size of the operation; 3)
alternative uses of agricultural land; and 4) the supply of contracted
land. Results indicate limited support for the agency problem hypoth-
esis and reject the risk aversion and farmer managerial ability hypoth-
eses. Regression equations used to select lease term hypotheses indicate
that cash rent levels are sensitive to land quality, supply of contract
acres, irrigation, and crops produced. Tenant shares of the crop and
variable costs are less sensitive to land quality than cash rents. Other
variables that inﬂuence tenant shares of the crop and variable costs
include tenant/landlord social capital, the supply of contracted acres,
and crop selection.
Contracted agricultural land has been shown to have several advantages over
agricultural land purchased on credit. First, contracted land allows operators to
farm with less debt, thus decreasing the likelihood of bankruptcy. Second,
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Third, contracted land is typically associated with higher cash ﬂow (Hotell and
Harrington, 1979; Baker and Thomassin, 1991). Similarly, there are sufﬁcient
monetary and non-monetary incentives to make owning and contracting out
agricultural land attractive to investors. In the United States 43% of agricultural
land was contracted in 1992. Moreover, in ﬁve states (Arkansas, California,
Illinois, Iowa, and Louisiana) which exhibit crop-intensive agriculture and a high
proportion of commercial farms, 50% or more of agricultural land was contracted
(1992 Census of Agriculture).
Contract decision-making, here deﬁned as contract choice (cash rent versus
shares) and the selection of contract terms (levels of cash rent and shares), has
important implications for tenant/landlord sharing of total net revenue, risk, and
managerial responsibilities. Because of this, a substantial literature has developed
which tests land contract choice hypotheses. Hypotheses tested include the agency
problem, tenant/landlord sharing of risk, tenant/landlord social capital, tenant
managerial ability, the agricultural ladder, and tenant credit constraints. The
empirical evidence from this literature, however, does not universally support any
one hypothesis or subset of hypotheses, and in many instances, the conclusions
drawn are conﬂicting. It is difﬁcult to draw conclusions from the empirical land
contract choice literature because: 1) study data are gathered over different time
periods and locations; 2) the set of explanatory variables are not consistent across
studies; and, 3) results are often consistent with alternative competing hypotheses
which authors often fail to acknowledge. Surprisingly, there is no literature on the
selection of contract terms which is a serious shortcoming since contract terms are
equally as important as contract choice in determining tenant/landlord sharing of
total net revenue, risk, and managerial responsibilities. Given the inability to draw
conclusions from the contract choice literature and the lack of contract term
studies, further empirical research is needed in the land contract decision-making
area.
The primary purpose of this study is to test cropland contract decision-making
hypotheses with data from eastern Arkansas. Unlike earlier studies, both contract
choice and selection of contract terms hypotheses are tested. And, unlike the
dichotomous choice between cash rent and share contracts found in earlier studies,
we allow for trichotomous contract choice by distinguishing between share
contracts in which both output and variable costs are shared (costshare) and those
contracts in which only output is shared (cropshare). Furthermore, emphasis is
placed on tenant credit constraints as the underlying rationale for lease choice.
Even though Heady recognized the importance of credit constraints in cropland
contract choice over 50 years ago, this hypothesis has attracted little attention in
the empirical literature.
The following section reviews the relevant contract choice literature. The
second section discusses the Arkansas data set. The third section provides a
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from ordered probit models to test alternative contract choice hypothesis with
emphasis placed on a credit constraint hypothesis are presented in section four.
The contract term results are discussed in section ﬁve followed by the conclu-
sions.
RELEVANT CONTRACT CHOICE LITERATURE
Empirical tests of cropland contract choice hypotheses have focused on small-
scale agriculture in developing countries (especially India), southern U.S. agri-
culture in the post-Civil War period, and modern agriculture in the north central
region of the United States. See Dasgupta, Knight, and Love (1999) for a review
of the cropland contract choice literature. Because of the relevance of modern
U.S. studies, they are brieﬂy reviewed here. Brown and Atkinson (1981)
hypothesize that a major function of contract choice is to distinguish between
tenants with varying degrees of managerial ability so that, ceteris paribus, those
tenants with better managerial skills will prefer cash rent contracts in which
tenants typically have higher levels of managerial discretion over share contracts
in which tenants and landlords tend to work more closely together. Brown and
Atkinson use contingency valuation to test the tenant managerial ability hypoth-
esis. Tenant managerial ability variables are found to be related to contract choice
in a manner which is consistent with the tenant managerial ability hypothesis.
Gwilliam (1993) indicates that tenant/landlord social capital levels are a key
determinant of contract choice. Speciﬁcally, Gwilliam hypothesizes that with
share contracts there is a synergism that occurs when tenants and landlords
combine their managerial skills which results in higher total net returns than in
cash rent contracts in which landlords are less involved in decision-making.
Gwilliam further hypothesizes that tenant/landlord synergism increases with
tenant/landlord social capital and thus the probability of choosing a share contract.
A Michigan data set weakly supports the social capital theory.
Allen and Lueck (1992, 1993) test the agency problem hypothesis. Under the
agency problem, each contracting situation presents unique opportunities for the
tenant to take undetected advantage of the landlord. This assumes that landlords
cannot use output as a proxy for tenant effort due to the uncertainties of weather
and other natural forces. Examples of the agency problem include: 1) cropshare
contracts give incentives to supply inputs at levels which maximize tenant net
returns and not joint tenant/landlord net returns, 2) share contracts give incentives
to underreport crop yields, 3) costshare contracts give incentives to divert landlord
supplied inputs to other uses, and 4) cash rent contracts give incentives to
overutilize landlord supplied inputs, i.e., soil characteristics. Empirical evidence
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Dakota data is consistent with the agency problem hypothesis.
DATA SET
The data for this study are taken from 447 respondents to the 1991 Cropland
Rental Arrangement Survey which was mailed to a random sample of 1,513
tenants in crop reporting districts three, six, and nine of eastern Arkansas. The
sample was selected by the Arkansas state ofﬁce of the National Agricultural
Statistical Service (NASS). Because contract choice and the selection of contract
terms are crop sensitive, tenants were asked to treat each crop in a contract
separately. When multiple contracts and multiple crops in a contract are taken into
account, there are 880 usable responses which are composed of 191 cash rent, 478
cropshare, and 211 costshare contracts.
Eastern Arkansas is an intensively cropped area where contracting is the
dominant land tenure form. The region contains 83% of Arkansas’ cropland and
produces over 92% of the state’s cash crops. Livestock production is relatively
unimportant. The data set is attractive for testing cropland contract decision-
making hypotheses because farm operators in the region are highly dependent on
land contracting; there is a good mix of cash rent, cropshare, and costshare
contracts; and high input crops such as cotton and rice as well as low input crops
are produced.
Model variable deﬁnitions are reported in Table 1 and summary statistics are
reported in Table 2. Tenant farm sizes tend to be large with 44.5% of contracts on
farms over 1000 operating acres, 32.2% on farms between 500 and 1000 operating
acres, and only 23.3% of contracts on farms under 500 operating acres. Most
tenants are full-time farm operators. Only in 13.5% of contracts do tenants derive
less than 50% of their total family income from farming while in 69.2% of the
contracts farm income accounts for more than 75% of total family income.
Interestingly, about 36% of contracts are between relatives. About 60% of leases
are irrigated. Rice is grown on 25% of contracts, irrigated soybeans 23%, dryland
wheat 22%, dryland soybeans 10%, irrigated cotton 7%, irrigated sorghum 5%,
and dryland cotton 3%.
THE CREDIT CONSTRAINT HYPOTHESIS AND TESTABLE IMPLICATIONS
The credit constraint hypothesis assumes that a tenant chooses a cropland contract
in order to maximize net returns subject to a credit constraint. While all cropland
contracts relieve the tenant of the long-term debt payments associated with owned
land, they have differential impacts on operating expenses. In a cash rent contract
the tenant pays the landowner a ﬁxed annual cash payment, pays all operating
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expenses by the amount of the ﬁxed cash payment, however, this is thought to be
less than the annual debt payment associated with land ownership (Hottel and
Harrington, 1979). In a cropshare contract the tenant shares the crop with the
landlord and is responsible for all operating expenses. There is no difference in
operating expense levels between a cropshare contract and ownership (assuming
no inefﬁciences with a cropshare). With a costshare contract, the tenant gives the
landlord a share of the output—typically higher than a cropshare contract—but
unlike the cropshare contract, the landlord pays a share of the operating expenses.
The costshare contract reduces the tenant’s operating expenses by the amount of
the landlord’s share of operating expenses. Under the credit constraint hypothesis,
tenants are able to overcome credit constraints (increase leverage) and expand by
moving from a cash rent to a cropshare to a costshare contract. Since landlords
expect additional ﬁnancial and managerial compensation to induce them to take
Table 1. Model Variable Deﬁnitions
Variable Deﬁnition
Dependent Variables
CONTRACT 0 if contract a cash rent; 1 if contract a cropshare; 2 if contract a costshare.
RENT Cash rent ($/acre) if CONTRACT 5 0.
CROPCROP Tenant’s share (%) of CONTRACT 5 1
CROPCOST Tenant’s share (%) of crop if CONTRACT 5 2
COSTCOST Tenant’s share (%) of operating expenses if CONTRACT 5 2
Explanatory Variables
OPERATED Number of acres operated by tenant.
EQUITY Ratio of owned to operated acres.
LABOR 1 if family provides less than 25% of labor; 2 if family provides 25–49%;
3 if family provides 50–75%; 4 if family provides . 75%.
START 1 if inherit land from relatives; 2 if purchase from relatives; 3 if purchase from non-
relatives; 4 if contract from relatives; 5 if contract from non-relatives.
YEARS Number of years parcel has been contracted from landlord.
INCOME 1 if , 25% of income from farming; 2 if 25–49%; 3 if 50–75%; 4 if . 75%.
IRRIGATION 1 if contracted parcel is irrigated; 0 otherwise.
QUALITY 1980–1990 county average soybean yield (bu/acre).
SUPPLY Ratio of 1987 contracted acres in county to number of operators in county.
VARIANCE 1980–1990 county yield coefﬁcient of variation for pertinent crop.
ROW 1 if planted crop is cotton, soybeans, corn, or sorghum; 0 otherwise.
DENSITY 1990 county population per square mile.
ACRES Number of acres in contracted parcel.
RELATIVE 1 if landlord is a relative; 0 otherwise.
EDUCATION 1 if less than 8 years; 2 if some high school; 3 if high school diploma;
4 if vo-tech school; 5 if some college; 6 if bachelor’s degree or higher.
AGE Age of tenant in years.
RICE 1 if contracted parcel is planted in rice; 0 otherwise.
ISOY 1 if contracted parcel is planted in irrigated soybeans; 0 otherwise.
DSOY 1 if contracted parcel is planted in dryland soybeans; 0 otherwise.
ICOTTON 1 if contracted parcel is planted in irrigated cotton; 0 otherwise.
DCOTTON 1 if contracted parcel is planted in dryland cotton; 0 otherwise.
ISORGHUM 1 if contracted parcel is planted in irrigated sorghum; 0 otherwise.
DSORGHUM 1 if contracted parcel is planted in dryland sorghum; 0 otherwise.
Cropland Rental Decision Making 107on share contracts, per acre tenant proﬁts are typically highest with a cash rent
contract, followed by cropshare and costshare contracts, ceteris paribus (Parsch
and Danforth, 1994; Parsch, Danforth, and Watkins, 1994; Dunaway and Morrow,
1980; Hottel and Harrington, 1979).
Following the credit constraint hypothesis, the probability of choosing a
costshare (cash rent) contract should increase (decrease) with operating expenses,
cash rent, and landlord ﬁnancial strength. Thus, variables that indicate the levels
of operating expenses, cash rent, and tenant and landlord ﬁnancial strength are
useful for testing the credit constraint hypothesis. Because the survey queried
tenants only, there are no landlord ﬁnancial variables available. However, this
may not be as problematic as it appears. Landlords typically have higher equity
levels and more diverse asset portfolios than tenants and thus their credit
constraints are less binding. In 1988 the average U.S. landlord held 327 acres
valued at $197,772 of which 85.3% of landlords had a 100% equity interest. Only
4% of landlords had less than a 60% equity interest in their land. Furthermore, for











CONTRACT 1.02 0 1 2 0 2
RENT — 49.3 — — 10.0 121.0
CROPCROP — — 73.2 — 10.0 90.0
CROPCOST — — — 66.5 50.0 80.0
COSTCOST — — — 76.0 50.5 94.1
Explanatory Variables
OPERATED 1085 951 1099 1178 37 5000
EQUITY 0.18 0.26 0.15 0.16 0 0.95
LABOR 2.55 2.61 2.55 2.49 1 4
START 1.76 1.79 1.75 1.76 1 5
YEARS 12.84 11.76 12.86 13.80 1 52
INCOME 3.50 3.41 3.51 3.55 1 4
IRRIGATION 0.60 0.47 0.61 0.70 0 1
QUALITY 23.3 23.7 22.9 23.8 18.6 28.6
SUPPLY 430.7 481.7 406.9 439.9 72.1 729.5
VARIANCE 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.08 0.46
ROW 0.53 0.58 0.53 0.47 0 1
DENSITY 38.7 43.4 38.7 34.6 14.7 97.0
ACRES 244 196 266 265 4 1850
RELATIVE 0.36 0.30 0.38 0.37 0 1
EDUCATION 4.16 4.15 4.16 4.17 1 6
AGE 46 48 45 46 21 82
RICE 0.25 0.18 0.24 0.33 0 1
ISOY 0.23 0.18 0.24 0.24 0 1
DSOY 0.10 0.05 0.10 0.05 0 1
ICOTTON 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.07 0 1
DCOTTON 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.03 0 1
ISORGHUM 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.07 0 1
DORGHUM 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0 1
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income and for only 19.8% did it represent more than 50% (1987 Agriculture
Census, Vol. 2, Part 3). Thus, for the purposes of testing the credit constraint
hypothesis, operating expenses, cash rent, and tenant ﬁnancial indicators should
be the most relevant explanatory variables. Ted L. Glaub, a professional farm
manager from Jonesboro, Arkansas and the president elect of the American
Society of Farm Managers and Rural Appraisers, Inc., indicates that tenants have
signiﬁcant input in lease decision-making because 1) the majority of tenants and
landlords are relatives or close friends at the time contracts are entered into, 2)
good farm managers are high in demand by landlords, and 3) tenants typically
have better information than landlords (personal communication). Empirical
proxies for tenant ﬁnancial indicators, operating expenses, and cash rents are
described below.
An important tenant ﬁnancial indicator is the level of collateral or equity held
in the operation. Because bankers are usually more willing to lend to tenants with
higher equity levels, the probability of choosing a cropshare contract should
decrease as equity increases. Akin to equity are the conditions under which the
tenant began operating. For example, did the tenant get a “good start” by
inheriting a sizable tract of land or did he experience a “poor start” in which all
land was initially contracted from non-relatives? Because tenant ﬁnancial indica-
tors are slow to change and the conditions under which the tenant began operating
should be reﬂected in current ﬁnancial indicators, we hypothesize that a poor start
in farming increases the probability of choosing a costshare contract. A potential
means of overcoming credit constraints is to borrow from off-farm income.
Tenants may utilize off-farm income to purchase assets, secure loans, and smooth
out cash ﬂows. As off-farm income increases, the probability of choosing a
costshare contract would decrease. A ﬁnal tenant ﬁnancial indicator with which to
test the credit constraint hypothesis is the total number of operating acres. Larger
farms tend to be more highly leveraged which increases the likelihood that they
will be denied credit. The testable implication is that the probability of choosing
a costshare contract increases with total operating acres.
There are several characteristics which indicate operating expense and cash
rent levels for contracted parcels. First, the number of acres in the contract is
positively related to total operating expenses and total cash rent. Thus, larger
tracts of land are expected to be cost shared. Second, higher quality land (higher
soil fertility) renders higher yields and thus commands higher per acre cash rents.
Because of this, land quality should be positively related to the probability of
choosing a costshare contract. Third, the presence of irrigation is an important
determinant of operating expenses and cash rent levels. Irrigation encourages
tenants to use higher per acre variable input levels because the primary yield risk
factor, insufﬁcient moisture, is no longer a concern and water is complementary
with other inputs. Because irrigation increases operating expenses and commands
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probability of choosing a costshare contract. Fourth, per acre cash rent is
inﬂuenced by the supply and demand for contracted land. High per acre cash rent,
associated with a small supply of available contract acres, will increase operating
expenses—making costshare contracts more attractive. Fifth, some tenants are
able to furnish inputs which reduce their cash operating expenses. One of the most
common examples of this is family labor. Thus, we hypothesize that as tenants are
able to supply a higher percentage of labor needs, the probability of choosing a
costshare contract will decrease. Finally, we expect that tenants with poor
ﬁnancial indicators seek to lock in contracts with favorable ﬁnancial terms for
extended periods of time. Johnson and Lins (1974) note that while most cropland
contracts are legally of a short-term nature, they are quite stable and evolve into
long-term commitments. Tenants in this survey held their leases for an average of
nearly 13 years. Johnson, (1974) and Allen and Lueck (1992) found similarly
lengthy tenant/landlord relations. Thus, we expect that the number of years the
parcel has been contracted will be positively related to the probability of selecting
a costshare contract.
ORDERED PROBIT ANALYSIS OF CONTRACT CHOICE HYPOTHESES
Ordered Probit
Under the credit constraint hypothesis there are three contract choices which have
an inherent, ordinal ordering according to their ﬁnancial incentives. This indicates
that a method that is capable of assigning a probability to choosing each of the
three contracts is needed. Ordered multinomial probit that is estimated with a
maximum likelihood procedure is such a method. In the trinomial ordered
problem the cumulative density function is split into three ordered sections, each
of which represents the probability of choosing one of the three contract types. In
order to split the cumulative density function into three ordered categories,
another parameter, m, must be estimated along with the coefﬁcients of the
independent variables, b. The Prob[Y50] (cash rent) 5 1 2 F(b9 X), where F(b9
X) is the cumulative density function of the standard normal density function
evaluated at b9 X. The Prob[Y51] (cropshare) 5 F(m 2 b9 X) 2 F(2b9 X) and
the Prob[Y52] (costshare) 5 1 2 F(m 2 b9 X) with m . 0.
The kth component of the ordered multinomial probit coefﬁcient vector
estimate, b, does not have the usual interpretation of the marginal change in Y as
xk increases. In itself b only indicates the qualitative change in Y as xk increases,
according to the sign of b. The marginal change in the probability of selecting Y
as xk increases is estimated by the standard normal density function of the
underlying cumulative density function. The marginal probability of choosing
Y 5 0a sx k increases is 2f(b9 X)bk, the marginal probability of choosing Y 5
110 International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Vol. 2/No. 1/19991a sx k increases is f(2b9 X)bk 2 f(m 2 b9 X)bk , and the marginal probability
of choosing Y 5 2a sx k increases is f(m 2 b9 X)bk. Note that unlike the classical
regression model, the marginal change in probabilities is a function of b9 Xa s
well as bk. Since f( z ) is strictly greater than zero, positive coefﬁcient estimates
indicate that the probability that a costshare contract is chosen increases as xk
increases and the probability that a cash rent contract is chosen decreases. The
opposite holds for negative coefﬁcient estimates. The sign on the marginal
probability function for a cropshare contract as xk increases, however cannot be
determined unless the function is evaluated at a given X. It is likely that the
marginal probability function for the cropshare contract changes signs as X varies.
Credit Constraint Model Results and Interpretation
The coefﬁcient estimates for the ‘credit constraint’ ordered probit model are
reported in the ﬁrst column of Table 3. Asymptotic t-ratios are reported in
parentheses. Several of the model variables are signiﬁcant at the a 5 0.10 level
and higher, and m is positive and signiﬁcant, supporting the hypothesis that the
three contracts are ordered according to their ﬁnancial incentives as a priori
hypothesized.
All of the tenant ﬁnancial indicators—OPERATED, EQUITY, LABOR,
START, YEARS, and INCOME—have the correct, anticipated sign, and OPER-
ATED, EQUITY, and YEARS are signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level. This result is
consistent with the credit constraint hypothesis and it supports the notion that
tenants play a signiﬁcant role in contract choice. EQUITY, the ratio of owned to
operated acres, is used as a proxy for tenant equity. Tenants with higher ratios of
owned to operated acres should have relatively higher equity levels because with
time equity positions in owned cropland increase as land debt is paid down, ceteris
paribus. Since tenants hold no equity position in contracted cropland, it follows
that the equity position for owned land will be greater than or equal to the equity
position of contracted land. Since cropland constitutes the bulk of total tenant
owned and contracted assets, this difference should be substantive. Ellinger and
Barry (1987) ﬁnd that increasing EQUITY is associated with higher levels of
equity and lower debt-to-asset ratios. The authors ﬁnd similar relationships with
a Kansas Farm Management Association (KFMA) data set of 409 farms for the
1977 to 1992 period (see Langemeier (1990) for documentation of KFMA data
set).
Following the earlier discussion, factors which affect the cash rent levels of
contracted cropland should also play a role in contract choice. We hypothesize
that IRRIGATION and QUALITY will increase cash rent and the probability of
choosing a costshare lease while SUPPLY will decrease cash rent and the
probability of choosing a costshare lease. The estimated coefﬁcients on IRRIGA-
TION, QUALITY, and SUPPLY have the anticipated signs, and the IRRIGA-









OPERATED 0.0001** — 0.0001**
(1.979)
1 (1.995)
EQUITY 20.8119*** — 20.6893***
(24.884) (24.980)
LABOR 20.0068 — 20.0045
(0.196) (0.132)
START 0.0798 — 0.0781
(1.341) (1.306)
YEARS 0.0086** — 0.0105**
(2.065) (2.493)
INCOME 0.0251 0.0182 0.0004
(0.508) (0.388) (0.008)
IRRIGATION 0.3179*** 0.3265*** —
(3.948) (4.051)
QUALITY 0.0080 — 0.0102
(0.525) (0.672)
SUPPLY 20.0009*** — 20.0009***
(23.045) (22.948)
VARIANCE 21.3594* — —
(21.768)
ROW — 20.2223*** —
(22.870)
DENSITY — 20.0057*** —
(23.541)
ACRES — 0.0004** —
(2.251)
RELATIVE — 0.1000 —
(1.193)
EDUCATION — 20.0139 —
(20.501)
AGE — 20.0010 —
(20.285)
RICE — — 0.3222***
(2.943)
ISOY — — 0.1973*
(1.718)
DSOY — — 20.3428**
(22.196)
ICOTTON — — 0.2086
(1.152)
DCOTTON — — 20.1965
(20.992)
ISORGHUM — — 0.3012*
(1.670)
DSORGHUM — — 20.1015
(20.461)
m 1.5507*** 1.5418*** 1.5696***
(26.583) (26.005) (26.199)
(continued)
112 International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Vol. 2/No. 1/1999TION and SUPPLY coefﬁcient estimates are highly signiﬁcant. This result is
consistent with the credit constraint hypothesis and, speciﬁcally, that factors
which affect cash rent levels play a role in contract choice.
In addition to the credit constraint hypothesis, we test the risk aversion
hypothesis which is based on the idea that share contracts are chosen in order to
share yield risk between the tenant and the landlord. Under the risk aversion
hypothesis yield variance should be positively related to the probability of
choosing a costshare contract. Following the literature, VARIANCE is used as a
proxy for risk aversion. Contrary to the risk aversion hypothesis and consistent
with the Allen and Lueck (1993) ﬁndings, VARIANCE is found to be negatively
related to the probability of choosing a costshare contract and weakly signiﬁcant
(two-sided test).
Alternative Model: Agency Problem
Explanatory variables are chosen for the ‘Alternative Hypothesis Model’ (the
second model in Table 3) in order to render results comparable to the Allen and
Lueck (1992) binomial ‘Farmer’ model which explains the choice between cash
rent and share contracts. Under the risk aversion theory INCOME is expected to
be positively related to the probability of choosing a costshare contract because
tenants are thought to want to reduce the variability of their farm income as the
importance of their non-farm income declines. Thus, under both the credit









Davidson-McKinnon Tests of Non-nested Hypotheses Tests
H0: 1 true model x
2 5 16.81**
H1: 2 true model
H0: 1 true model x
2 5 6.55
H1: 3 true model
H0: 2 true model x
2 5 31.63**
H1: 1 true model
H0: 2 true model x
2 5 36.81**
H1: 3 true model
H0: 3 true model x
2 5 0.61
H1: 1 true model
H0: 3 true model x
2 5 18.44**
H1: 2 true model
***Signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level
**Signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level
*Signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level
1Asymptotic t-ratios
Cropland Rental Decision Making 113estimated coefﬁcent is positive and like Allen and Lueck, insigniﬁcant. Under the
agency problem, Allen and Lueck hypothesize that IRRIGATION is negatively
correlated to the probability of choosing a share contract because tenants cannot
deplete soil moisture on irrigated land and thus landlords should be inclined to
grant a cash rent contract. They ﬁnd support for their hypothesis, but here, the
signiﬁcant positive sign on IRRIGATION supports the credit constraint, not the
agency problem hypothesis. In a similar vein, Allen and Lueck expect ROW to be
positively related to the probability of choosing a costshare contract due to the
intensive cultivation practices of row crops. Allen and Lueck ﬁnd support for this
hypothesis, but here, the signiﬁcant negative sign on ROW is contrary to the
agency problem hypothesis. In Allen and Lueck DENSITY—which serves as a
proxy for alternative uses of agricultural land—is hypothesized to be inversely
related to the probability of choosing a share contract since landowners should be
more willing to cash rent because they are less concerned about soil degradation
when alternative uses for farm land are strong. Here, like Allen and Lueck, the
sign on DENSITY is negative and signiﬁcant—supporting the agency problem
hypothesis. Allen and Lueck use ACRES as a control variable which they ﬁnd to
be insigniﬁcant. Under the credit constraint hypothesis, the variable ACRES is
expected to be positively related to the likelihood of choosing a costshare contract
because tenants who lease larger acreages have higher operating expenses and
thus should be more likely to need landlord ﬁnancing. The coefﬁcient estimate is
positive and signiﬁcant—consistent with the credit constraint hypothesis.
Otsaka and Hayami (1988) note that contracts between family members should
be easier to enforce, so that the variable RELATIVE is expected to be positively
related to the probability of choosing a costshare contract. The insigniﬁcant
RELATIVE coefﬁcient corroborates Allen and Lueck’s ﬁndings that family
relations do not appear to play an important role in contract choice.
Following Brown and Atkinson (1981), EDUCATION and AGE—proxies for
managerial ability—are expected to be inversely related to the probability of
choosing a costshare contract. Allen and Lueck, based on the agricultural ladder
theory, hypothesize that AGE is negatively related to the probability of choosing
a share contract. In the agricultural ladder theory, farmers move from share
contracts to cash rent to owner-operators over their life-time. Although both
EDUCATION and AGE carry the expected negative sign, neither is signiﬁcant—
thus neither the agricultural ladder nor the agency problem theory is supported.
Alternative Model: Risk Aversion
The “Risk Aversion Model” is estimated to further explore the risk aversion
hypothesis. In place of VARIANCE, dummy variables are used for rice, irrigated
and dryland soybeans, irrigated and dryland cotton, and irrigated and dryland
sorghum. IRRIGATION is dropped in order to avoid multicollinearity with the
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30% higher than the means of VARIANCE for rice and soybeans. According to
the risk aversion hypothesis, this would indicate that DCOTTON and DSOR-
GHUM would be the strongest candidates for share contracts. RICE and ISOY
would be the strongest candidates for cash rent contracts. Contrary to the risk
aversion hypothesis, the results indicate that irrigated crops tend to be positively
related to the likelihood of selecting costshare contracts and dryland crops to be
inversely related to the probability of selecting costshare contracts. The coefﬁ-
cients on ICOTTON, DCOTTON, and DSORGHUM are not statistically signif-
icant, however. These results are consistent with the credit constraint hypothesis
in which irrigated crops need greater landlord ﬁnancing since operating expenses
and cash rents are higher.
Davidson and MacKinnon’s non-nested testing procedure (Greene, 1997, p.
365) is used to determine whether one of the ordered probit models is preferred
over the other two. The hypothesis Ho:y5 f(Xb) versus H1:y5 f(Zb) is tested,
where X and Z are alternative matrices of explanatory variables. Following
Davidson and MacKinnon, the model y 5 f(Xb) and the augmented model y 5
f(Xb 1 Z1G1) are ﬁtted, where Z1 contains the variables in Z that are not in X.
The likelihood ratio test is then used to test the hypothesis that G1 5 0. Test results
reported in Table 3 do not favor any model over the other two.
ANALYSIS OF CONTRACT TERM REGRESSIONS
In this section, regression models are estimated which explain: 1) the tenant’s cash
rent level in a cash rent contract; 2) the tenant’s percentage share of the crop in
a cropshare contract; and 3) the tenant’s percentage share of the crop and costs in
a costshare contract. OLS estimates are likely to be inconsistent because cash
rents are observed only when CONTRACT 5 0, the tenant’s share of the crop
only when CONTRACT 5 1, etc. Thus, in effect, CONTRACT and the contract
terms are correlated. This problem is referred to as incidental truncation and is
akin to the omitted variable speciﬁcation problem. By adding the inverse Mills
ratio (IMR) from the ordered probit model to the regressions, the inconsistency
problem can be rectiﬁed.
Following Greene (1992), the IMR is estimated for each observation from the
ordered probit model evaluated at Prob[Contracti 5 j]. In the regression
equations, the appropriate dependent variable is regressed on X and the IMR using
OLS, which is the Heckman (1979) approach. The coefﬁcients’ standard errors
are computed as recommended in Greene (1992).
We hypothesize that cash rent and tenant share levels are based on land and
tenant characteristics, tenant/landlord social capital, crop selection, and the supply
of contract acres. Land characteristics include QUALITY, VARIANCE, IRRI-
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tenant crop shares higher (tenant cost shares lower) in order to induce tenants to
take on land with higher yield variances. Similarly, we hypothesize that higher
quality land as proxied for by QUALITY and IRRIGATION are associated with
higher cash rents and lower tenant crop shares because these tracts are higher
valued and higher yielding. Because of operating convenience and economies of
scale, we hypothesize that tracts of land with larger acreages (ACRES) are
associated with higher cash rents and lower tenant crop shares.
We hypothesize that tenants with superior managerial skills as proxied for with
EDUCATION are associated with lower cash rents and higher tenant crop shares
because of superior bargaining and search skills, and they are in greater demand
as tenants. We hypothesize that landlords give better terms to the tenant when
social capital is high, i.e., tenant and landlord are related (RELATIVE) or have
worked together for numerous years (YEARS). Following the law of supply and
demand, we hypothesize that a larger supply of contracted land (SUPPLY) results
in lower cash rents and higher tenant crop shares. Tenants who are less dependent
on leasing should be in a stronger bargaining position and thus cash rents should
decrease and tenant crop shares increase with EQUITY. Finally, cash rent and
shares may vary by crop. We hypothesize that higher valued crops such as cotton
and rice demand higher cash rents and lower tenant crop shares. Ameliorating the
higher values of cotton and rice is the specialized harvesting equipment, high
operating costs (especially for cotton), and superior managerial skills needed to
produce these crops. These factors suggest that tenants may need to receive larger
crop shares to induce them to take on cotton and rice production.
Regression model coefﬁcient estimates are reported in Table 4. Asymptotic
t-ratios are reported in parentheses. Variable deﬁnitions are reported in Table 1
with the exception that SOY, COTTON, and SORGHUM are aggregated over
dryland and irrigated soybeans, cotton, and sorghum, respectively. The RENT
model determines the tenant’s cash rent level if a cash rent contract is selected.
The CROPCROP model determines the tenant’s crop share if a cropshare contract
is chosen. If a costshare contract is chosen, separate models are estimated for the
crop share and the cost share. These two models are denoted as CROPCOST and
COSTCOST, respectively. The dependent variable COSTCOST is measured as a
weighted average of the tenant’s cost share of seven variable inputs. The variable
inputs queried in the survey are seed, fertilizer/lime, pesticide, aerial application,
machinery fuel/oil, custom machinery hire, and other. The weights sum to one and
are the percentage of total variable costs that each of the seven variable inputs
represent. The weights are taken from Windham et al. The coefﬁcients of
determination are around 0.3 or higher except for CROPCROP, which is
reasonable for cross-sectional data. The asymptotic t-ratios on the Inverse Mill’s
ratio indicate that the bias created by incidental truncation is not signiﬁcant for
any of the four regressions.
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IRRIGATION, and ACRES have the expected signs and only ACRES is
insigniﬁcant. These results are consistent with the notion that land characteristics
are important determinants of cash rent levels. The negative sign on the
VARIANCE coefﬁcient estimate explains why land with higher yield variances is
cash rented and not shared, and is consistent with the credit constraint hypothesis.
Irrigated land carries a $10.34 premium over dryland. EDUCATION RELATIVE,
and YEARS are neither signiﬁcant nor of the anticipated sign, indicating that
neither tenant managerial skills nor tenant/landlord social capital play a role in
determining cash rent levels. Contrary to expectations, SUPPLY is positive and
signiﬁcant. We have no explanation for this result. EQUITY has the anticipated
sign, but is not signiﬁcant.
The crop dummy coefﬁcient estimates indicate that cash rent premiums are
Table 4. Estimated Coefﬁcients for Regression Equations
(Contract Terms)
Independent Variable RENT CROPCROP CROPCOST COSTCOST
CONSTANT 4.4700 80.9940*** 99.9286*** 109.5257***
(0.244)
1 (10.935) (11.469) (8.989)
QUALITY 1.7996*** 20.3315* 21.3699*** 21.5645***
(3.738) (21.851) (25.906) (25.287)
VARIANCE 2110.8387*** 28.1137 228.7265 215.4037
(23.450) (20.635) (21.556) (20.525)
IRRIGATION 10.3372*** 1.0524 27.9762*** 28.9426***
(3.947) (1.190) (5.587) (4.380)
ACRES 0.0060 0.0005 0.0028 0.0009
(0.917) (0.326) (1.039) (0.243)
EDUCATION 0.1354 20.3682 0.4101 20.0296
(0.150) (21.366) (0.977) (0.054)
RELATIVE 2.9552 21.7701** 2.8651** 3.4578*
(1.159) (22.108) (2.128) (1.940)
YEARS 20.0162 0.0746* 0.0256 20.0168
(20.117) (1.865) (0.409) (20.192)
SUPPLY 0.0153* 0.0093*** 20.0072 20.0130**
(1.800) (3.680) (21.512) (22.106)
EQUITY 24.5720 3.9113** 20.9853 20.8289
(21.026) (2.169) (20.346) (20.226)
SOY 24.8569* 0.3154 9.1274*** 12.2896***
(21.654) (0.285) (5.345) (4.888)
COTTON 5.4107 3.0993 11.9372*** 14.0835***
(1.036) (1.500) (4.007) (3.192)
SORGHUM 20.7891 0.3092 10.7063*** 8.0246**
(20.150) (0.180) (4.105) (2.139)
INVERSE MILL’S 6.4473 24.4948 3.1125 9.0336
RATIO (0.750) (0.576) (0.765) (1.473)
F-statistic 7.64 2.45 9.68 11.79
ADJ. R
2 0.3136 0.0381 0.3485 0.3784
***Signiﬁcant at 0.01 level
**Signiﬁcant at 0.05 level
*Signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level
1Asymptotic t-ratios
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(2$4.57) which is consistent with the notion that higher-valued crops command
higher cash rents. However, only the soybean coefﬁcient estimate is signiﬁcant.
It is anticipated that the hypotheses for each of the variables in the RENT
equation will also hold in the three share equations, with the anticipated sign for
each of the share equation coefﬁcients being the opposite of their counterpart in
the RENT equation. In the CROPCROP equation the coefﬁcient estimate on
QUALITY has the anticipated sign and is signiﬁcant. VARIANCE, IRRIGA-
TION, and ACRES do not have the anticipated sign and are not signiﬁcant—
indicating that land characteristics are less important in determining crop share
than cash rent levels. EDUCATION does not have the anticipated sign and is not
signiﬁcant. Interestingly, RELATIVE indicates that if tenants and landlords are
related, the tenant receives a smaller share. YEARS has the anticipated positive
sign and is signiﬁcant. The coefﬁcient estimates of SUPPLY and EQUITY which
are signiﬁcant, support the hypotheses that tenants receive higher crop shares as
supplies of leased acres and equity levels increase. All of the crop dummy
coefﬁcients are positive, but none are signiﬁcant.
The coefﬁcient estimates on the CROPCOST and COSTCOST models indicate
that there is a tradeoff between crop and cost shares in costshare contracts. That
is, if the tenant receives a higher share of the crop, he will typically bear a higher
share of the costs. Note that as the tenant’s share of the crop and cost increase in
a similar proportion, the tenant’s net income would be expected to increase.
This tradeoff is demonstrated by similar signs on all of the signiﬁcant
coefﬁcient estimates in the two costshare regressions. QUALITY carries the
anticipated negative sign and is highly signiﬁcant. The coefﬁcient estimates on
VARIANCE and ACRES are contrary to expectations and insigniﬁcant. As
expected, the IRRIGATION coefﬁcient estimates carry the expected negative
signs and are highly signiﬁcant. The signs on EDUCATION are not consistent
across the two regressions and the two coefﬁcient estimates are not signiﬁcant.
Unlike the CROPCROP model, RELATIVE is positive as expected and signiﬁ-
cant. Contrary to expectations, SUPPLY is negative, but signiﬁcant only for the
COSTCOST regression. The sign on EQUITY is contrary to expectations and is
not signiﬁcant. Soybeans, cotton, and sorghum receive share premiums in relation
to rice. The smaller share on rice is consistent with the landlord attempting to
collect a higher percentage of the government payments, which for rice are
traditionally the highest of grains in the deﬁciency payment program.
CONCLUSIONS
This study examines land contract decision-making with the use of an eastern
Arkansas data set. Ordered probit models are used to test a credit constraint and
other alternative contract choice hypotheses. Four regressions which account for
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rent and share levels (lease terms). The ordered probit results support the credit
constraint hypothesis, indicating that contract choice is based on: 1) the tenant’s
ﬁnancial position and operating expense levels, 2) the size of the operation; 3)
alternative uses of agricultural land; and 4) the supply of contracted land. Results
indicate limited support for the agency problem hypothesis and reject the risk
aversion and farmer managerial ability hypotheses.
The regression equations indicate that cash rent levels are sensitive to land
quality, supply of contract acres, irrigation, and crops produced. Tenant shares of
the crop and variable costs are less sensitive to land quality than cash rents. Other
variables which inﬂuence tenant shares of the crop and variable costs include
tenant/landlord social capital, the supply of contracted acres, and crop selection.
For costshare contracts, the tenant’s crop and cost shares vary proportionately.
Our results indicate that the credit constraint hypothesis has merit and should
be given equal consideration with the agency problem and risk aversion when
considering contract choice theories. U.S. contract choice studies indicate that
results may be sensitive to such factors as location, crop types, and costs. A goal
of future studies may be to disentangle these effects on contract choice using a
data set composed of heterogeneous farms from diverse geographic areas.
NOTES
1. Typically, in a costshare contract, operating expenses are shared at the same level as the crop
since this is widely considered to maximize total net returns. In effect, however, crop shares and
total operating expense shares are unlikely to be the same since not all operating expenses are
typically shared.
2. Landowners typically play a greater managerial role in cropshare and costshare contracts
because they have a direct stake in the growing crop.
3. A 1997 survey of eastern Arkansas tenants by the same authors indicates that about 92% of
tenants and landlords were relatives, close friends or acquaintances at the time the initial
contract was entered into.
4. Based on 1994 Arkansas Cooperative Extension Services published enterprise budgets
(Windham et al., 1994), per acre irrigated production costs are estimated to be 76% higher than
per acre non-irrigated production costs for the same crop.
5. The variables LABOR, EDUCATION, INCOME, START, and SALES are modeled as
continuous variables even though they could also be modeled as qualitative variables using
binary variables. It is assumed that the numerical values assigned are reasonable for measuring
the factors of interest. This quantitative approach is used to provide a parsimonious parame-
terization for the probit model where an excessive numbers of parameters could lead to
computational problems in obtaining parameter estimates and for ease of interpretation. Also,
these variables were collected in the survey as categorical data.
6. Because contract type and terms are likely chosen simultaneously, an argument could be made
that the contract choice and contract terms models should contain the same set of independent
variables. Empirically this is not practical because the IMR is highly correlated with the set of
independent variables in the ﬁrst-step probit equation, which causes collinearity problems in the
Cropland Rental Decision Making 119second-step regressions. To correct this problem, a set of independent variables are used in the
probit model which explain contract selection, but which are not highly collinear with the set
of independent variables in the regression equation.
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